The following is the first round of response from Maz R. 1-page critiques were submitted from a variety of sources against my Ontological Argument against God, and a small group of Christian judges selected Maz’s critique as the strongest. The following is a refined and extended version of Maz’s critique. I will post my own response within a week.
— Chris
Replies to C.B. Robertson’s Ontological Argument for the Non-Existence of God
By Maz R
Introduction
Robertson’s Ontological Argument for the Non-Existence of God attempts to move from an analysis of human concepts and experience to the stronger ontological conclusion that God cannot exist independently of the human mind. The argument is ambitious and raises several questions concerning divine simplicity, predication, phenomenology, and the relationship between epistemology and ontology. However, this paper argues that Robertson’s central conclusion is unsupported. The argument depends upon a number of mistaken assumptions about classical theism, unclear or insufficiently defended conceptual distinctions, and several inferential moves which do not follow from the premises provided. The objections below are divided into major and minor rebuttals. Major rebuttals identify problems which independently undermine premises or inferences necessary to Robertson’s conclusion, while minor rebuttals identify further ambiguities, unsupported assumptions, and areas requiring greater philosophical justification.
The following are seven major rebuttals to C.B. Robertson’s Ontological Argument for the Non-Existence of God. “Major” rebuttals are those which individually refute a claim or logic necessary to Robertson’s argument:
1. Misrepresentation of Classical Theism: The most significant issue is Robertson’s misunderstanding of the divine simplicity, among other aspects, of the God of classical theism. Robertson claims to be refuting classical monotheism while assuming an ontology that classical monotheism explicitly rejects. These conflicts are logically significant and catastrophic for Robertson’s premises. This author believes this is not an intentional mischaracterization, but rather a lack of subject familiarity. Regardless, many issues result; some of which are listed as follows:
a. Robertson treats “goodness,” “knowledge,” “being,” “truth,” etc. as though they were independently constituted properties or categories and asserts an entity called God can stand in relation to all of them. Robertson’s God is an individual first, with added properties, such as Being and Goodness (§1, §4). This leads to a composite God, which classical theism rejects (in favor of divine simplicity). This leads Robertson to assert; If God is one, then Being, Truth, Love, Goodness, Justice, etc. must all belong to the same conceptual category (§1). This is based on the false assumption that a diversity of concepts necessitates a diversity in God’s attributes. This mistakes a unity of referent for a univocity of concepts. This logic error undergirds the majority of Robertson’s argument. Likewise, Robertson’s model appears to treat God as an underlying individual that instantiates ontologically distinct properties; classical divine simplicity explicitly rejects this kind of composition.
b. Classical Theism holds that God is without unrealized potential (actus purus); as such, all that he is must exist in eternal actuality, independent of humans. Robertson cites motion and stillness as examples of mutually exclusive properties which God holds; therefore, leading to a contradiction (§2). Robertson’s other main argument revolves around pain (§3). Motion, spatial rest, and pain are not pure perfections that classical theism attributes formally to the divine essence (Aquinas, ST, I, Q13 A2, 3, 5). Motion involves change and potency; pain involves passibility. Neither therefore follows from God’s grounding creatures capable of motion or pain. Robertson seems to miss this distinction entirely, which grounds exclusive rejection for his premises.
c. Robertson assumes personal relationality is dependent upon human existence as it requires experience. Trinitarians reject this, as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share relational experience to each other, prior to the existence of humans. Ex: In the case of the relation of Love; The Father loves the Son. This occurs without human experience.
d. Robertson implies God’s experience of time is that of momentary succession. Many of his arguments rely on God operating within time-space, such as those of motion and pain (§§2-3). However, Classical theism states God is immutable and does not experience past or future, but eternal present (Aquinas ST, I, Q10, A1).
e. Robertson appears to assert that the motion of God is that of a body (§2). However, classical theology explicitly states that God is entirely bodiless/incorporeal and therefore never in motion (Aquinas, CT, Ch16). Likewise, according to classical theology, God is immutable; therefore, local motion, which entails spatial change, is incompatible with divine incorporeality.
f. Robertson states God is “persistence of being itself”, following “ipsum esse subsistens” (§1). However, this is incorrect, as God is not persistence, but rather “Being itself subsisting”. This is the accepted accurate translation of Aquinas’ ipsum esse subsistens and is not logically equivalent to “persistence of being itself”.
2. Grounding-Exemplification Error: Robertson repeatedly appears to infer from God’s being the metaphysical ground of X that God must Himself exemplify X univocally (§2; cf §3). This inference does not follow. The cause or metaphysical ground of X does not necessarily instantiate X in the same mode as X. “God causes motion” or “God necessitates/is the entity of Being in which movement is founded” does not entail “God is moving” – therefore “things which have Being are moving and not moving, thus possess mutually exclusive properties” does not follow. This is a confusion of causal possession with formal/univocal exemplification. This error occurs in many places, such as the section on pain. God being the ultimate cause of pain does not imply that God must experience pain. To be the “ground of X” does not imply “univocal exemplification of X”. Additionally, this argument rests again on the claim that God is a composite individual with ontologically distinct properties, which classical theism rejects.
3. Epistemic Leap: Perhaps one of the most damning errors of Robertson’s argument comes from the leap from the human epistemic position to an ontological claim (§§3-4). If we assume his argument to be true, it does not imply that God cannot exist. The title of the paper claims to be a positive claim of non-existence, yet is predicated on human epistemic standing. Epistemic failure doesn’t entail ontological nonexistence. For the epistemic proposition ¬Ks(P), apply ontological proposition ¬P; The former simply does not entail the latter: ¬Ks(P)⊬¬P; Or even: we possess no adequate concept of X, does not entail: ¬∃x(Xx).
4. Phenomenological-Real Leap: Robertson claims a concept of God is phenomenologically constructed, therefore there cannot be an extra-mental referent corresponding to it (§§3-4). This inference is strictly logically invalid, and resembles a genetic fallacy. For example, Tom’s concept of Mount Fuji is entirely instantiated as phenomenological content within his consciousness; true, but Mount Fuji is not located inside Tom’s skull. Likewise, humans acquired the concept of electrons through human perceptual experience, theoretical inference, mathematical modelling and language; true, but would not follow that therefore electrons cannot exist independently of human cognition. We may even see cases where internal or phenomenological experience point towards pre-existing external entities. For example, Tom’s pain pointing towards the thing he stepped on, which he did not know was there before the pain occurred. Some thinkers even posit something like, “thirst implies the existence of water”. Internal representation does not imply the object needs to be as well. Robertson explicitly acknowledges: our knowledge of particulars can precede knowledge of their foundation, while the ontological foundation can nevertheless precede the particulars (§1). However, this logic is not maintained for God’s attributes. Consider goodness. Suppose the epistemic order is: (1) good acts → concept of goodness → God. It does not follow that the ontological order is the same. The theist proposes: (2) God → created goodness → our experience of goodness. Those sequences are perfectly compatible. One is ordo cognoscendi, the order of knowing. The other is ordo essendi, the order of being. Robertson recognizes this distinction when discussing matter but abandons it when discussing divine attributes.
5. Unsupported internal-external taxonomy: Robertson’s distinction between “externally grounded” and “internally-grounded” concepts (§3) is asserted rather than independently established. Merely dividing concepts into two classes does not demonstrate that the division tracks a metaphysically significant distinction. Not only is the justification unstated, but there appears to be ambiguity between the two categories. It is also not stated why each category is mutually exclusive. Robertson’s own example of pain is quite difficult to sort into “internal” or “external” grounding categories, when further consideration is taken. A painful experience may be phenomenologically internal while nevertheless being caused by mind-independent external events. For example, someone may be electroshocked or undergo neural manipulation. The experience of pain, the concept of pain, and the ground or cause of pain, are all nonequivalent; and some are more “internal” than others. Conversely, pain may arise from internal physiological causes or even occur within dreams; which some may intuitively call “hallucinatory pain”, as opposed to “real pain”. Furthermore, pain can be understood even when no pain is phenomenologically present. For example, Tom can see John is in pain without experiencing it himself. Agents can even conceive of past and future pain, which is often powerful enough to affect their present mental states, without experiencing it internally. Thus, phenomenological internality, causal internality, epistemic access, and ontological mind dependence must be distinguished. Robertson appears to move between these senses of “internal” without demonstrating their equivalence. An abstract understanding of pain also seems to blur the lines between internal and external categorization. Most importantly, even if pain requires a conscious subject in order to be experienced, it does not follow that goodness, justice, love, truth, or power are mind-dependent in the same sense. For example, numerous theories of Love and Justice state they are strictly non-phenomenological, but something like a relation; a calculator can give mathematical truths; and a tsunami seems to display notions of “power”. The argument therefore requires an independent justification both for the proposed taxonomy and for assigning the relevant divine predicates to the “internally grounded” category.
6. False Dilemma, analogical predication: Robertson says, either: (1) God resembles the things He grounds, in which case contradictory creaturely predicates become contradictions in God; or (2) God does not resemble them, in which case we can know nothing about Him (§2). However, classical theism rejects this in favor of analogical predication. The goodness of God and goodness of a human being are not predicated: purely univocally, as though they possessed goodness in exactly the same manner; nor purely equivocally, as though “good” meant completely unrelated things. We predicate it analogically. It is possible to have analogical knowledge of a transcendent cause through its effects without comprehending the cause univocally.
7. Self-undermining argument: Robertson concludes “God cannot exist outside/independent of the human mind” (§§3-4). Is that claim: (1) objectively true independently of human experience? Or: (2) merely an internally grounded human conceptual construction? If (1), then he has conceded that at least some truth is not internally grounded in his sense. If (2), it cannot license the mind-independent ontological conclusion: “God does not exist.” At most, Robertson can conclude; “Within Robertson’s phenomenological conceptual framework, God is represented as a human construction.” That is a claim about Robertson’s conceptual scheme, not God’s ontology. This is potentially self-undermining.
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The following are ten minor rebuttals to C.B. Robertson’s Ontological Argument for the Non-Existence of God. “Minor” rebuttals are those which point to areas of weakness, such as unsupported claims, hidden premises, linguistic vagueness, or areas of contention. While the minor claims may not attack main premises or go beyond the scope of the paper, many are significant; and even more so when taken in aggregate:
1. Unsupported epistemic assumption of non-theism: Robertson’s paper seems to be written from a point of view which presupposes a Godless reality. There are many examples of this; the earliest one being, “The vast majority of humans have not seen or met God” and “God is not so much experienced or directly inferred” (§1). Robertson does not explain why all cases of miracles or theophany, including a universal theophanic worldview, are epistemically insufficient. Nor does he explain why logical inference is epistemically insufficient only in cases related to God.
2. God as an idea, false dilemma: Robertson asserts that God is an idea or concept (§1). This is not a position held by classical theism. Robertson’s argument for this is a false dilemma: either (1) God is directly experienced or (2) God is an idea.
3. Lacking definition of God: While Robertson’s argument is against God, he does not give a sufficient definition of what God is ontologically. Robertson lists attributes commonly associated with God (§1), but is ultimately vague and sometimes incorrect (see major rebuttal 1f above). Robertson says “Perhaps most importantly, he is one” (§1), which, despite being the most important property of God, is the vaguest. Additionally, Robertson claims this paper argues against the God of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (§4); however, these religions share contradictory claims of God’s nature, likely requiring Robertson to sufficiently specify a target at times. However, elsewhere, Robertson has stated this is an argument against classical Christian theism; so this is taken herein as the basis of the arguments broadly.
4. Universalism and linguistic designation of properties: A main argument relies on the claim that we observe motion, which is grounded in being, and since God is Being itself, God must be motion itself (§2). However, it can be said that “motion” is a linguistic designation of a physical phenomenon – something like an object’s change in location. This is then externalized to be a property of God. Several problems arise, some of which follow:
a. If linguistic designations are subjective, reality, and therefore God, may have an infinite number of arbitrary properties for all possible combinations of all possible states and relations via mereological universalism. A rejection of this towards mereological nihilism or a form of eliminativism would lead to a collapse of Robertson’s argument. Despite this being a potential dilemma, Robertson’s view of composites is recognized as beyond the scope of this paper.
b. Assumptions that artifacts or other irrelevant properties and events are not in God’s nature are stated but never justified, given the same logic Robertson presents. “Motion” is grounded in being, therefore God is “Motion Itself” is asserted (§2), but “A lake” is grounded in being, therefore God is “A lake” is rejected (§1). This logic presumes God can be many strange things which are grounded in Being, such as “Fermentation Itself”, “Fragrance itself”, or “Sneezing Itself”.
c. It is not clear why one would posit a real entity for the phenomenon of motion into Motion Itself. It is never explained how linguistic designation becomes a real entity. This argument is couched within a referral to Zeno’s paradox (§2); however, Zeno’s paradox does not involve positing “infinite” as a real entity. The jump from linguistic designation to an entity appears to be non-sequitur.
5. God’s relation to logic: Robertson appeals to the claim that God must abide by logical laws (§2). While classical theologians, like Aquinas, do state that God cannot do what is logically contradictory (Aquinas, ST, I, Q25 A3), it is not uncommon to take the position that God is ultimately insubordinate to the rules of Logic. Others may use logical forms which are compatible with contradictions, etc. However, this is outside the scope of Robertson’s intended target.
6. Justice and mercy: Robertson asserts justice and mercy are in contradiction (§3). This is explicitly rejected and explained in classical theology (Aquinas, ST, I, Q21 A3 Ad2).
7. Ontology of pain: Robertson asserts “[pain itself] cannot be some outside entity, but somewhere in ourselves” (§3). This, however, is a massive assertion. It ignores the very complex and ongoing debate about the nature of pain. One critique, for example, may be from pain eliminativists, like Daniel Dennett. Again, this author believes this oversight stems from an unfamiliarity with various fields of philosophy, rather than an attempt to “sneak in” an argument.
8. Mind-dependence: Robertson states ultimately that Love, Justice, etc are internally grounded concepts, requiring mind-dependence (§§3-4). However, classical theology does state that reality is dependent, both in creation and subsistence, on God’s intellect (Aquinas, ST, I, Q16, A1). This may completely undermine all of Robertson’s work, even if we grant all other flaws.
Other thinkers take a more explicit stance, stating reality is specifically mind-dependent upon God’s intellect; such as George Berkeley’s immaterialist framework.
9. Knowledge from positive divine predication: Robertson largely states that humans experience phenomena, then have taken ideas and aggregated them into a singular idea of God (§§1, 4). This is a very particular form of positive divine predication. Maimonides alone causes trouble for the universal claim. Maimonidean negative theology emphatically denies that predicates like human knowledge, power, benevolence, etc. are simply projected univocally onto God. Aquinas gives another radically different account through analogy. Pseudo-Dionysus gives yet another apophatic tradition. Additionally, many traditions state that God is ultimately unknowable, and as such, to hinge an argument for existence upon subjective knowledge is futile.
10. General linguistic issues: In general, the work contains imprecise language which allows Robertson linguistic wiggle room incompatible with rigorous analytical analysis and logic. Many of these words are treated as interchangeable, which they are not. Some examples include:
a. “Ground” / “foundation” / “justification” (§§1, 3): These words are used almost interchangeably across the paper. This allows Robertson to move from ontological ground to epistemic justification. However, none of them are synonyms; a causal ground explains why something occurs, an ontological ground explains what something depends on for being, an epistemic justification explains why a belief is warranted. Although colloquially similar, they are philosophically distinct.
b. “Internal” (§§3-4): Likely the most widely reframed word in the paper, Robertson uses this word to jump from meaning experienced subjectively, to located physically within, to caused internally, to epistemically understood via first-hand experience, to mind dependent, to incapable of existing apart from the human mind. Robertson largely claims that “experienced internally” directly entails “ontologically mind-dependent”.
c. “Subjective” (§1, cf §4): While starting off meaning a thing which someone must undergo, it eventually ends up meaning non-objective, non-extra-mental, and ontologically dependent on consciousness.
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Conclusion
Robertson’s argument therefore does not establish the claimed ontological conclusion that God cannot exist independently of the human mind. The most serious difficulties arise from its treatment of the God of classical theism, its movement from phenomenological or epistemic claims to ontological conclusions, its grounding-exemplification assumptions, and its insufficiently justified distinction between internally and externally grounded concepts. These problems are independent enough that resolving any single objection would not by itself rescue the overall argument. The minor rebuttals further reveal areas in which key terminology, hidden premises, and philosophical assumptions require considerably greater clarification. At most, Robertson’s argument may provide a challenge concerning how human beings form and apply concepts of God; it does not successfully demonstrate that the referent of those concepts cannot exist extra mentally. The argument therefore remains, in its present form, epistemically and metaphysically underdetermined.
